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NOTES
SHOULDN'T THE CONSTITUTION BE COLOR
BLIND? METRO BROADCASTING, INC. v.
FCC TRANSMITS A SURPRISING
MESSAGE ON RACIAL
PREFERENCES
For nearly two decades, Americans witnessed affirmative efforts through-
out society to increase both educational and vocational opportunities for mi-
nority groups. During those same twenty years, Congress, governmental
agencies, and federal courts labored to exact the constitutional limits on ef-
forts to integrate minorities into society's mainstream.1 By nature, affirma-
tive action programs grant special benefits to some groups or individuals and
not to others. The question central to the debate, then, is whether affirma-
tive action programs violate the equal protection guarantees of the United
States Constitution.2
In addressing numerous challenges to affirmative action programs, the
United States Supreme Court has determined that government action based
on race, although suspect, is not always unconstitutional.3 The Court has
struggled, however, to delimit the particular circumstances under which ra-
cial preferences will survive scrutiny.4 The Court has traditionally subjected
racial classifications to a strict scrutiny analysis, finding race-conscious
measures constitutional if narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling govern-
ment interest.5
1. See, e.g., NAACP v. Federal Power Comm'n, 425 U.S. 662 (1976).
2. The fourteenth amendment commands that no state shall "deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The equal
protection requirement applies to the federal government as well, as an aspect of fifth amend-
ment due process. See Boling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (racial segregation in the District
of Columbia public schools violated the due process clause of the fifth amendment). Chief
Justice Warren's opinion in Boiling stated: "The Fifth Amendment... does not contain an
equal protection clause .... But the concepts of equal protection and due process, both
stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive." Id. at 499.
3. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
4. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson
Board of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); Fullilove, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
5. See, e.g., Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274.
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In the late 1980's, the Supreme Court continued to wrestle with the issue
of affirmative action.6 Finding racial preferences by state and local govern-
ments unconstitutional, the Court's decisions evidenced a trend toward strict
scrutiny of such programs to ensure protection of the rights of nonminori-
ties.7 Nevertheless, the question remained whether the same scrutiny would
apply to race-conscious measures imposed by the federal government.
Affirmative action plans with the imprimatur of Congress include those
used by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) to
encourage minority ownership of radio and television stations.' The FCC,
as regulator of the electronic media, assumed a unique role in the evolution
of affirmative action programs. Since its inception in 1934 as a "trafficker of
the airwaves," the FCC has expanded its role in telecommunications regula-
tion to become a promulgator of social policy.9 For instance, the Commis-
sion's minority preference policies sprang from governmental concern that a
lack of presentation of minority issues in the media contributed to the racial
unrest of the 1960's.1 Responding to suggestions that a change in the struc-
ture of media control could effect changes in the content of the media's por-
trayal of minorities," the FCC created rules to encourage minority
12
6. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 469; Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274.
7. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 495; see also Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (white
firefighters allowed to challenge consent decrees setting goals for hiring of blacks); Wards Cove
Packing v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (statistical evidence of a disparity between a racial
group's representation in a given job category and the population at large is insufficient to shift
the burden of proof to the employer in a discrimination claim).
8. Reexamination of the Commission's Comparative Licensing, Distress Sales and Tax
Certificate Policies Premised on Racial, Ethnic, or Gender Classifications, 1 F.C.C. Red 1315
(1986).
9. Kalmanir, A Strange Animal: The FCC and Broadcast EEO, 6 COMM. & L. 25
(1984).
10. Nondiscrimination in Employment Practices of Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C.2d 766
(1968).
11. See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 210-
13 (1968).
12. For the purposes of this Note, minorities include those groups that the FCC considers
minorities: Blacks, Hispanics, American Indians, Asians, Alaska Natives, and Pacific Island-
ers. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(i)(3XC)(ii) (1988).
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ownership of radio and television stations. 3 Congress subsequently voiced
its approval of those policies.' 4
While the Supreme Court exhibited greater concern for the equal protec-
tion of both minorities and nonminorities, challenges arose in the lower
courts and at the agency level alleging that the FCC's racial preference poli-
cies violated the fifth amendment. 5 Congress intervened in these proceed-
ings by exercising its power to regulate federal spending.' 6 Specifically,
Congress included a provision in the FCC's appropriations for fiscal years
1988 and 1989 that divested the FCC of authority to eliminate or reexamine
policies designed to expand minority control of broadcasting.17 The result-
13. See Reexamination of the Commission's Comparative Licensing, Distress Sales and
Tax Certificate Policies Premised on Racial, Ethnic, or Gender Classifications, 1 F.C.C. Rcd
1315 (1986); Commission Policy Regarding the Advancement of Minority Ownership in
Broadcasting, 92 F.C.C.2d 849 (1982). The Commission's incentives include tax certificates,
distress sales, and minority enhancement credit in the comparative hearing process. The tax
certificate permits substantial tax savings to broadcasters who sell their properties to minority
purchasers. Congress granted the Commission authority to issue a certificate which treats the
sale of a broadcast property as a deferred capital gain if the sale helps the Commission to
effectuate a new policy or to implement a policy change relevant to the ownership of broadcast
stations. 28 U.S.C. § 1071 (1988). Under the tax certificate policy, a broadcaster qualifies for
a deferred capital gain if he sells his facilities to an entity with at least fifty percent minority
ownership. Regarding the Advancement of Minority Ownership in Broadcasting Commission
Policy, 92 F.C.C.2d at 853 (1982). For a discussion of the distress sale and the comparative
hearing preference, see infra text accompanying notes 49-80.
14. H.R. REP. No. 208, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 897 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 396, 1259. Congress stated "[i]t is the firm intention of the conferees
that ownership by minorities, such as blacks and hispanics, as well as by women, and owner-
ship by other underrepresented groups.., is to be encouraged through the award of significant
preferences." Id. Congress made this statement in relation to its amendment of the Commu-
nications Act to empower the FCC to grant radio broadcasting licenses through the use of a
random selection system. Communications Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-259, 96
Stat. 1087, 1094-95 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309(i)(3)(A) and (C)(ii) (1988)). Congress
amended § 309(i) to provide that "[t]o further diversify the ownership of the media of mass
communications, an additional significant preference shall be granted to any applicant con-
trolled by a member or members of a minority group." 47 U.S.C. § 309(i)(3)(A) (1988). To
date, the Commission has not instituted the lottery system and still relies on the comparative
hearing process in granting broadcast licenses.
15. See Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc. v. FCC, 876 F.2d 902, 934 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (invalidating the Commission's distress sale policy), rev'd sub nom. Metro Broadcasting,
Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990); Winter Park Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 873 F.2d 347
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (upholding FCC's minority enhancement credit policy), aff'd sub non. Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
16. See Continuing Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat.
1329, 1329-31 (1987); Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary and Re-
lated Agencies Appropriation Act, 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-459, 102 Stat. 2186, 2216-17 (1988)
[hereinafter Related Agencies Appropriation Act].
17. Related Agencies Appropriation Act, supra note 16, at 2217. The appropriations leg-
islation prohibits the Commission from using funds "to repeal, to retroactively apply changes
in, or to continue a reexamination of" the Commission's policies premised on racial, ethnic or
1991]
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ing confrontation involving the courts, Congress, and the federal agency ulti-
mately reached the Supreme Court. Considering its recent precedent on
race-based programs,18 the Court used challenges to two of the FCC's mi-
nority preference policies to transmit a surprising message on racial prefer-
ence programs sanctioned by the federal government.19
In Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,20 the Court held that the two chal-
lenged FCC minority preference policies, the "distress sale"21 and the award
of a plus-factor to minority-owned companies when deciding among compet-
ing applicants for new licenses,22 did not violate equal protection princi-
ples.2 3 The Court, for the first time, upheld Congress' power to adopt
affirmative action plans to promote racial and ethnic diversity rather than
simply to remedy past discrimination.24
In Metro, the FCC awarded a television license to the Rainbow Broadcast-
ing Corporation (Rainbow) over the competing Metro Broadcasting Corpo-
ration (Metro).25 Because the Commission's broadcast licensing policy
favored minority applicants, Rainbow's 90 percent minority ownership gave
it a comparative advantage over the 19.8 percent minority ownership of
Metro.26 Metro appealed the award of the license to Rainbow.27
After the FCC's order awarding the license to Rainbow, but before the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit heard
Metro's appeal, the Commission began an inquiry to explore the validity of
its minority preference policies.28 In light of the inquiry, the D.C. Circuit
remanded the appeal to the Commission for further consideration.29 Before
the FCC could complete its investigation, however, Congress enacted the
gender classifications, except to (1) close its proceeding investigating the preference policies,
(2) reinstate prior policy, and (3) lift any suspension imposed on implementing the policies
pending the FCC's investigation. Id. For a discussion of the FCC's proceeding investigating
the preference policies, see infra note 178.
18. The Metro Court distinguished its decisions in Wygant and Croson to uphold the
FCC's minority preference policies. See infra notes 203-05 and accompanying text.
19. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
20. Id.
21. The distress sale allows broadcasters whose licenses are threatened with revocation to
sell to a minority at a discounted price. See infra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
22. Minority owners who propose to manage the station are awarded an enhancement
credit during the comparative hearing proceedings. See infra notes 49-75 and accompanying
text.
23. Metro, 110 S. Ct. at 3026-28.
24. Id at 3009-10.
25. Id at 3005-06.
26. Id.
27. Id at 3006.
28. For a discussion of the FCC's inquiry, see infra note 178 and accompanying text.
29. Metro, 110 S. Ct. at 3006.
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FCC appropriations legislation for fiscal year 1988, prohibiting the FCC
from "spending any appropriated funds to examine or change its minority
• . . policies." 30 The FCC closed its inquiry and reaffirmed its grant of the
license to Rainbow, and the court of appeals affirmed.3 1
Meanwhile, Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc. (Shurberg), sought
review in the D.C. Circuit of an FCC order approving Faith Center Inc.'s
"distress sale" of its television license to a minority enterprise, Astroline
Communications. 32  The court delayed disposition of Shurberg's appeal
pending resolution of the same FCC inquiry that delayed the court's review
in Metro. 3 3 The FCC, upon closing the inquiry, reaffirmed its order allowing
the distress sale to Astroline.34 The appellate court then invalidated the dis-
tress sale policy, ruling that the policy deprived Shurberg, a nonminority
applicant for a license in the relevant market, of its right to equal protection
under the fifth amendment."
The United States Supreme Court consolidated the two cases for opinion
in Metro, and ultimately upheld both FCC policies. 36 Writing for the major-
ity, Justice Brennan reasoned that the minority preferences involved did not
violate equal protection because they "b[ore] the imprimatur of longstanding
congressional support and direction and [were] substantially related to the
achievement of the important governmental objective of broadcast diver-
sity."37 Although the Court had traditionally applied strict scrutiny to race
based classifications, in Metro, the Court applied an intermediate standard of
review to the FCC's race-based programs.
Writing for the dissent, Justice O'Connor criticized the majority for ap-
plying an intermediate level of scrutiny to racial classifications employed by
Congress.3" Asserting that the fourteenth amendment applies to the federal
government as well as the states, Justice O'Connor declared that strict scru-
tiny is the proper test for analyzing any race-based program. 39 The dissent
concluded that the FCC's policies would fail to pass constitutional muster




32. Id. at 3007.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 3007-08.
36. Id. at 3027-28.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 3029 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 3030.
40. Id. at 3041.
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In a separate dissent, Justice Kennedy noted that the majority decision
repeated the errors of Plessy v. Ferguson.4" In that 1896 decision, which
resulted in the infamous "separate but equal" doctrine, the Court gave its
blessing to race conscious measures. 2 Justice Kennedy concluded that the
Court's decision in Metro resulted in a doctrine of "unequal but benign," a
philosophy indistinguishable from Plessy's holding of separate but equal. a
This Note examines how the Court's decision upholding the FCC's minor-
ity preference policies weakened the constitutional barriers to racial discrim-
ination. First, it focuses on the FCC's statutory authority to regulate in the
context of the public interest standard and traces the development of the
FCC's minority preference policies. It then analyzes the underlying assump-
tion of the minority preference policies, namely, that minority control in the
media necessarily leads to the programming of diverse information. Next,
the Note traces the judiciary's struggle to define constitutional limits on af-
firmative action programs. This Note then examines the Supreme Court's
majority and dissenting opinions in Metro, and concludes that the Metro
majority failed to apply the correct level of scrutiny to the race-based classifi-
cations employed by the FCC. As a result, this Note suggests, the Metro
Court set a dangerous precedent by making discrimination on the basis of
race easily justifiable. In addition, this Note argues that the Court's decision
in Metro sets the ideal of achieving racial equality back one hundred years by
perpetuating stereotypes that have come to be anathema in the United
States, and by endorsing the concept of a nation divided into racial blocs.
I. GAUGING THE PUBLIC'S INTEREST: THE NATURE OF THE FCC's
REGULATORY AUTHORITY
Before examining the constitutionality of the FCC's minority preference
policies, it should be clear where the policies "fit" within the FCC's regula-
tory scheme. The FCC performs a unique balancing act in regulating the
broadcasting industry. Specifically, the Commission must consider the
rights of both broadcasters and their audiences in promulgating regulations
and granting licenses. Underlying the Commission's decisions are concerns
about the scarcity of broadcasting frequencies, the high capital costs neces-
41. Id. at 3044 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia joined in the dissent.
42. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). After 58 years, the Court finally announced
the demise of Plessy in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
43. 110 S. Ct. at 3047 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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sary to operate a station, and the potential dangers of a concentration of
media control."
A. The Public Interest Standard
The Communications Act of 1934 (Communications Act)45 mandates that
the FCC fulfill its regulatory duties as the "public convenience, interest, or
necessity requires."'  The public interest concept is the sine qua non of fed-
eral broadcast regulation. This standard equips the FCC with broad discre-
tionary powers to grant, renew, and modify broadcast licenses, as well as to
make rules and regulations.47 Central to the FCC's regulatory framework is
the notion that the "scarcity" of broadcasting frequencies requires broad-
casters to act as "public trustees" in exchange for the privilege of frequency
use.
48
44. See generally Fowler & Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60
TEX. L. REv. 207 (1982) (emphasizing the need to treat broadcasters not as fiduciaries but as
marketplace competitors).
45. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
46. Id. § 303.
47. FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 793 (1978); FCC v.
WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223, 229 (1946); FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138
(1940); see 47 U.S.C. § 303(r), which states that the "Commission ... as public convenience,
interest, or necessity requires shall ... [m]ake such rules and regulations and prescribe such
restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with law, as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions of (the Act]." The Supreme Court has deferred to FCC regulation of broadcast
licensees, acknowledging the Commission's expertise in determining the means necessary to
effect the public interest goal. Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380 (1969) (the
Court declared that it would normally bow to agency interpretation of the Communications
Act); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215-17 (1943) (the Court gave
the Commission power to construe the public interest standard broadly).
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has recognized that Congress did not intend by the
Communications Act to vest an unlimited power in the FCC. See, e.g., FCC v. RCA Commu-
nications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 90 (1953) (stating that Congress did not intend "to transfer its
legislative power to the unbounded discretion of the regulatory body"); National Broadcasting
Co.. 319 U.S. at 216 (1943) (the public interest standard is "not to be interpreted as setting up
a standard so indefinite as to confer an unlimited power") (quoting Federal Radio Comm'n v.
Nelson Bros. Co., 289 U.S. 266, 285 (1933)).
48. See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 44, at 213-21; see also Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 394
("[l]icenses to broadcast do not confer ownership of designated frequencies, but only the tem-
porary privilege of using them." (citing 47 U.S.C. § 301); Comment. Minority and Gender
Enhancements" A Necessary and Valid Means to Achieve Diversity in the Broadcast Market-
place, 40 FED. COMM. L.J. 89 (1988) [hereinafter Minority and Gender Enhancements]; Com-
ment, The Constitutionality of the FCC's Use of Race and Sex in the Granting of Broadcast
Licenses, 83 Nw, U.L. REv. 665, 670 n.40 (1989). See generally Broadcast Regulation Reform,
1983: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Fi-
nance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (Congress
also adheres to the standard that broadcasters are trustees of a public good).
1991]
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B. The FCCs Minority Preference Policies
1. The Comparative Hearing Process
Because the broadcast spectrum is limited, competition for licenses is
fierce; many competitors file applications with the FCC for each available
license.49 The Commission attempts to achieve two fundamental objectives
when choosing a broadcast licensee from among qualified applicants. The
first is to select the broadcaster that would provide "the best practicable
service to the public."50 The second is to create diversification, "a maximum
diffusion of control of the media of mass communications."51
When faced with several competing applicants for a single available
broadcasting frequency, the FCC conducts a comparative hearing proceed-
ing to determine which applicant will best help the Commission reach its
two primary objectives.52 The comparative hearing is divided into two
stages. First, each applicant is evaluated under certain minimum qualifica-
tion standards prescribed by the Communications Act.53 These qualifica-
tions mandate that the applicant be legally,
5 4 technically,55 and financially 6
49. For example, for an available FM frequency in New York, the number of applicants
can reach over 300; in Richmond, Virginia, approximately 50, and in San Francisco, between
50 and 75 applications per frequency. Minority and Gender Enhancements, supra note 48, at
93 n.29.
50. Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, I F.C.C.2d 393, 394 (1965).
51. Id.
52. See Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327, 331 n.2, 333 (1945).
53. 47 U.S.C. § 308(b) (1988) ("all applicants for station licenses... shall set forth such
facts as the Commission by regulation may prescribe as to the citizenship, character, and finan-
cial, technical, and other qualifications of the applicant to operate the station .... ). The
Commission first looks at whether the applicant is legally, technically, financially and other-
wise qualified. See infra notes 54-56; Application for Construction Permit for Commercial
Broadcast Station, FCC Form 301; Reexamination of the Commission's Comparative Licens-
ing, Distress Sales and Tax Certificate Policies Premised on Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Classi-
fications, 1 F.C.C. Rcd 1315 (1986); Spitzer, Multicriteria Choice Processes: An Application of
Public Choice Theory to Bakke, the FCC, and the Courts, 88 YALE L.J. 717, 732-33 (1979).
54. Legal qualifications include citizenship, history of legal difficulties, ownership of other
broadcast interests, and proposed arrangements for station operations. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C.
§ 310(b) (requiring applicant, its directors, officers, and four-fifths of its stockholders to be
United States citizens); 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 (1990) (an applicant may not own any AM station
in the same market as the AM station that is being awarded).
55. Technical factors include availability of frequency, coverage and clarity of signal, stu-
dio location, antenna location and equipment requirements. See Application for Construction
Permit, FCC Form 301.
56. Financial considerations center on the sources from which the applicant will meet
application and construction costs, as well as operating expenses for the first year. See, e.g.,
West Michigan Telecasters, Inc. v. FCC, 396 F.2d 688 (D.C. Cir. 1968); 47 U.S.C. § 319(a);
Application for Construction Permit, FCC Form 301.
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qualified. Applicants meeting the preliminary requirements are "desig-
nate[d]... for a comparative hearing" before an administrative law judge."
The Commission5" evaluates the applicants in each comparative licensing
proceeding according to six specific criteria: (1) diversification of control,
specifically, whether the applicant holds any other mass communications
outlets; (2) integration, simply put, whether the owners intend to work at
the station as managers; (3) proposed program service; (4) the applicant's
past broadcast record; (5) efficient use of the frequency; and (6) the appli-
cant's character. 59
When the FCC set forth these comparative criteria, it did not address
whether minority ownership should play a role in selecting licensees from
among competing applicants. Rather, the current racial preference policies
sprang from a mandate of the D.C. Circuit. In TV 9, Inc. v. FCC' the
court of appeals overturned the Commission's refusal to award comparative
merit to a corporate applicant with two minority shareholders. 6 In refusing
to accord the applicant merit, the Commission focused solely on how the
applicant proposed to serve the public, and did not consider the applicant's
minority status. The Commission reasoned that the applicant made no dem-
onstration of how its minority ownership would translate into a public ser-
57. Spitzer, supra note 53, at 733-34.
58. "The Commission," as used here, may mean the Administative Law Judge (ALJ), the
Commission's Review Board, or the Commission in its entirety, as the following discussion of
FCC procedural rules for comparative licensing illustrates. The AIJ's decision becomes final
if no party fies exception within thirty days after its release, and the Commission does not
within an additional twenty days stay the initial decision so that it may consider the case. 47
C.F.R. §§ 1.276(a),(b),(d) (1990). Any party may appeal the AL's decision by filing excep-
tion with the FCC's Review Board, which possesses by delegation the Commision's review
authority in initial licensing cases. Id. §§ 1.276(a), 0.365(a), 1.271.
Reconsideration of a Review Board decision may be sought by petition fied within thirty
days. Id § 1.104(b). After disposition of the petition by the Review Board, the petitioner may
seek Commission review. Id. § 1.104(d). As an alternative to petitioning the Review Board
for reconsideration, the disappointed party may apply directly for review by the full Commis-
sion. Id. § 1.104(b).
The Commission may, at its discretion, accept the case for review. 47 U.S.C.
§§ 155(c)(4),(5) (1988); 47 C.F.R. § 1.115(g) (1990). The Commission may deny the applica-
tion for review without specifying reasons for its action. 47 U.S.C. § 155(c)(5); 47 C.F.R.
§ 1.11 5(g). In the alternative, the Commission may, with or without further proceedings such
as the receipt of briefs and oral argument, affirm, modify or set aside the Review Board's
action, or remand for further consideration. 47 U.S.C. § 155(c)(6); 47 C.F.R. § 1.1 15(h)-(i).
Judicial review of an FCC licensing action is obtainable exclusively in the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 47 U.S.C. § 402(b).
59. Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 394-99 (1965).
The Commission also reserves the right to consider other "relevant and substantial factors" on
an ad hoc basis. Id. at 399-400.
60. 495 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 986 (1974).
61. Id at 935-36.
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vice that the prevailing applicant could not provide.62 Moreover, the
Commission argued that the Communications Act required the agency to be
"color blind," and that minority ownership should not be a comparative
factor unless proven to result in some public interest benefit.6"
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit held that the FCC should favor applications
that make entrepreneurs of local minority groups."4 The court, emphasizing
that "maximum diversification of ownership" is a primary public interest
goal, concluded that when it is likely to foster diversity in programming,
minority ownership should be given substantial weight.65 The court then
remanded the case to the Commission with orders to grant the minority
owners comparative merit."
In TV 9, the court did not require the FCC to offer proof that minority
ownership and participation would result in programming diversity. 61 In-
stead, the court held that comparative merit should be granted given a "rea-
sonable expectation" of some public interest benefit.6" Two years later, in
Garrett v. FCC,69 the D.C. Circuit reinforced its TV 9 mandate. In Garrett,
Leroy Garrett, a member of a recognized minority group, was the sole owner
of a radio station competing to change its status from daytime to full time."°
Because Garrett failed to show how he would improve minority program-
ming, the Commission refused to grant him comparative merit.71 On ap-
peal, the D.C. Circuit held that the Commission erred in failing to grant
Garrett's minority status any weight.72 The court directed the FCC to as-
sume that minority ownership would result in minority programming.73 To-
gether, TV 9 and Garrett eliminated any requirement for an empirical
demonstration of a nexus between minority ownership of stations and diver-
sity of programming.
The Commission eventually decided to treat minority ownership and par-
ticipation as an enhancement to the standard comparative criterion of inte-
62. Id. at 936.
63. Id. (quoting Mid-Florida Television Corp., 33 F.C.C.2d 1, 17 (1970), review denied, 37
F.C.C.2d 559 (1972)).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 937.
66. Id. at 940.
67. Id at 938. The court stated that the FCC should grant merit because of the "stock
ownership... and... participation in station affairs" of the two black shareholders. Id at 941
(Fahy, J., supplemental) (footnote omitted).
68. Id. at 938.
69. 513 F.2d 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
70. Id. at 1057.
71. Id. at 1061.
72. Id. at 1063.
73. Id.
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gration of management, an element used to evaluate which competing
applicant is likely to provide the best practicable service to the public.74 In
other words, the FCC grants a preference to minority applicants in compara-
tive hearings only if the minority applicant proposes to participate in the
management of the station."
2. The Distress Sale Policy
A second measure adopted by the FCC to foster minority ownership in
broadcasting is the distress sale policy. 76 The distress sale permits a licensee,
whose license or renewal application is designated for hearing before the
FCC because the licensee's basic qualifications are in question, to transfer or
assign its license to a qualified minority purchaser at a distress sale price.7 7
Typically, the FCC would not permit a licensee in danger of losing its license
to sell its facility until the Commission resolved allegations regarding the
licensee's qualifications. 7' The distress sale policy is an exception that en-
ables licensees to mitigate potential financial losses by selling the station to a
minority-controlled entity for up to seventy-five percent of the station's fair
market value.79 Ordinarily, the loss of a license under these circumstances is
a total economic loss for the license holder.80
C. The Diversity Principle as a Means for Justifying the Minority
Preference Policies Under the Public Interest Standard
The FCC has long offered a nexus between minority ownership and pro-
gramming diversity, which the D.C. Circuit ordered the Commission to as-
sume in TV 9 and Garrett, as justification for implementing minority
enhancement credit and distress sale policies.8" The constitutionality of
74. See WPIX, Inc., 68 F.C.C.2d 381, 411-12 (1978).
75. Id
76. See Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, 68
F.C.C.2d 979, 983 (1978); see also Stereo Broadcasters, Inc. v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1026, 1028
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (stating that the purpose of the distress sale exception was "clearly ... the
promotion of minority ownership of broadcasting facilities").
77. Commission Policy Regarding the Advancement of Minority Ownership in Broad-
casting, 92 F.C.C.2d 849, 853 (1982). A qualified minority enterprise is one which meets the
Commission's basic qualifications and which also maintains a minority ownership interest ex-
ceeding fifty percent. A special policy, however, applies to limited partnerships: if a general
partner who holds a twenty percent interest is a member of a recognized minority group, the
enterprise is qualified. Id. at 855.
78. See Northland Television, Inc., 72 F.C.C.2d 51, 54-56 (1979).
79. See Lee Broadcasting Corp., 76 F.C.C.2d 462, 463 (1980).
80. Id.
81. See Reexamination of the Commission's Comparative Licensing, Distress Sales and
Tax Certificate Policies Premised on Racial, Ethnic, or Gender Classifications, I F.C.C. Red
1315 (1986); Commission Policy Regarding the Advancement of Minority Ownership in
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these preference policies must be analyzed in terms of whether programming
diversity survives scrutiny as a compelling governmental objective.
Media regulation attempts to ensure that Americans receive a broad spec-
trum of information from multiple sources.8 2 Diversity, an underlying goal
of the first amendment, is an integral part of the FCC's public interest stan-
dard. 3 The definition of public interest, as it applies to broadcast directives,
incorporates the ideal that the government has a duty to the nation's listen-
ing and viewing audiences to guarantee a lively and varied debate on contro-
versial issues.8 4 The FCC consistently has emphasized viewpoint diversity
as a primary public interest goal. 5
The FCC based its authority to regulate minority employment by broad-
casters on the belief that racial discrimination is incompatible with operating
in the public interest under the Communications Act.8 6 More importantly,
Broadcasting, 92 F.C.C.2d 849 (1982). While the Commission relies on a nexus between mi-
nority ownership and minority programming, research in this area is not conclusive. Findings
indicate that "simply changing the race of the owner of a minority-oriented station will not
necessarily improve that station's performance," but that the "relevance, quality, or position-
ing" of minority-oriented programming may be positively correlated with minority ownership.
See Singleton, FCC Minority Ownership Policy and Non-Entertainment Programming in Black
Oriented Radio Stations, 25 J. BROADCASrING 195, 199 (1981). But see Honig, The FCC and
its Fluctuating Commitment to Minority Ownership of Broadcast Facilities, 27 How. L.J. 859
(1984) (opportunities for minority ownership have been substituted for and not combined with
opportunities for minority participation in programming). See also infra note 274 (discussing a
study by the Congressional Research Service of the nexus between minority ownership and
minority programming).
82. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
83. Id (The first amendment calls for "the widest possible dissemination of information
from diverse and antagonistic sources.").
84. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (the "debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open"); see FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for
Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 795 (1978) (" 'The 'public interest' standard necessarily invites
reference to First Amendment principles .... (quoting Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 122 (1973)); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an
uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail .... ").
85. See, e.g., Reexamination of the Commission's Comparative Licensing, Distress Sales
and Tax Certificate Policies Premised on Racial, Ethnic or Gender Classifications, 1 F.C.C.
Rcd 1315 (1986).
86. Nondiscrimination Employment Practices of Broadcast Licenses, 18 F.C.C.2d 240
(1969). The Commission's minority policies are rooted in the social turbulence of the 1960's.
In 1967, a presidential advisory commission was established to investigate civil disorders, and
it issued a report which identified lack of presentation of minority issues in the media as a
contributor to racial unrest. See 0. KERNER, REPORT OF THE NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON
CIVIL DISORDERS (1968). The advisory commission suggested that a change in the structure
of media control could result in a corresponding change in the content of the media's portrayal
of minorities. See id In 1968, the FCC responded to the advisory commission's report by
creating a policy designed to eliminate discrimination in broadcast employment. Nondiscrimi-
nation in Employment Practices of Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C.2d 766 (1968). A decade
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in promulgating its regulations, the Commission assumed that a nexus exists
between minority employment and diversity in programming. The Com-
mission argued that by fostering minority control of broadcast stations, it
ensured that minority viewpoints would manifest themselves in station
programming.
The FCC began implementing basic Equal Opportunity Employment
(EEO) provisions in 1969 by adopting policies prohibiting discrimination
against minorities in broadcast employment." While the FCC's initial ef-
forts focused on broadcasters' hiring practices, the FCC more recently cre-
ated various regulatory measures to provide incentives for minorities to
pursue ownership of broadcast facilities, including the distress sale and mi-
nority enhancement credit at issue in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC. 9
Again, the Commission used the public interest standard to justify these
measures, specifically, the public's interest in receiving a wide variety of
programming. 9°
later, the United States Commission on Civil Rights determined that "to the extent that the
viewers' beliefs, attitudes, and behavior are affected by what they see on television, relations
between the races and sexes may be affected by television's limited and often stereotyped por-
trayals of men and women, both white and non-white." U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
WINDOw DRESSING ON THE SET: WOMEN AND MINORMES ON TELEVISION (1977).
87. Reexamination of the Commission's Comparative Licensing, Distress Sales and Tax
Certificate Policies Premised on Racial, Ethnic or Gender Classifications, 1 F.C.C. Rd 1315,
1315 (1986).
88. 18 F.C.C.2d at 240. The language of the FCC's EEO requirements is patterned after
federal law set forth in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)-
4(g)(i) (1970). One year later, the FCC began requiring annual employment reports from
broadcasters and written descriptions of EEO programs with broadcast license renewal appli-
cations. Petition for Rulemaking to Require Broadcast Licensees to Show Nondiscrimination
Employment Practices of Broadcast Licensees, 23 F.C.C.2d 430, 437 (1970); see also Nondis-
crimination in the Employment Policies and Practices of Broadcast Licensees, 60 F.C.C.2d
226, 227 (1976) ("the overall ability of broadcast stations to serve the public interest [is] related
to their employment policies and practices"); Nondiscrimination in the Employment Policies
and Practices of Broadcast Licensees, 54 F.C.C.2d 354, 358 (1975) (the Commission requires
broadcasters to "engage in a positive, continuing program of specific practices-to assure equal
employment opportunity with regard to recruiting, hiring, training, promotion and other per-
sonnel actions."). In 1971, the FCC amended these rules to require broadcasters to include
women in their EEO hiring and reporting obligations. Equal Employment Program, 32
F.C.C.2d 708 (1971).
89. See Commission Policy Regarding the Advancement of Minority Ownership in
Broadcasting, 92 F.C.C.2d 849, 853 (1982).
90. hI In the past, the Supreme Court applauded the FCC's ownership and employment
policies as consistent with the public interest standard and the first amendment goal of promot-
ing diversity of viewpoint on the airwaves. See, e.g., FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for
Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 795 (1978) (it is not inconsistent with the Communications Act
"for the Commission to conclude that the maximum benefit to the 'public interest' would
follow from allocation of broadcast licenses so as to promote diversification of the mass media
as a whole"); see also H.R. REP. No. 765, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 40, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE
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II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RACE-BASED CLASSIFICATIONS
Given that the FCC's minority preference policies are race-based classifi-
cations, their constitutionality must be assessed in light of equal protection
doctrine stemming from the fourteenth and fifth amendments and as pro-
nounced by the United States Supreme Court. The equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment commands that no state shall "deny to any
person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws."'" Literally, the
equal protection requirement of the fourteenth amendment applies only to
state action. Judicial interpretation, however, has applied fourteenth amend-
ment equal protection jurisprudence to the federal government as an aspect
of due process guaranteed under the fifth amendment.92 Thus, governmen-
tal classifications, whether state or federal, are subject to identical standards
of review for equal protection purposes.9a As the cases discussed below il-
lustrate, 94 equal protection analysis requires an examination of the purpose
which the FCC's policies were designed to further and a determination of
whether the policies will achieve their goal. Under the Supreme Court's
equal protection analysis, race based classifications employed to achieve a
goal that is less than "compelling" are unconstitutional. 95 Moreover, the
racial classifications will not pass constitutional muster if the programs un-
duly burden nonminorities, if race based programs are used without an at-
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2261, 2284 ("The nexus between diversity of media ownership and
diversity of programming sources has been respectfully recognized by both the Commission
and the courts."). In NAACP v. Federal Power Comm'n, 425 U.S. 662 (1976), the Court
examined whether the Federal Power Commission (FPC) had the authority to prohibit dis-
criminatory employment practices on the part of its regulatees. Id While finding that the
FPC lacked the authority, the Court distinguished the FCC's policies from the FPC's, pro-
claiming that the FCC's steps toward affirmative action were necessary to create programming
that reflected minority viewpoints. Id at 670 n.7. The Court sanctioned the FCC's unique
ability to regulate in this area, noting that the FCC's policies "can be justified as necessary to
enable the FCC to satisfy its obligation under the Communications Act of 1934 ... to ensure
that its licensees' programming fairly reflects the tastes and viewpoints of minority groups."
Id.
91. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
92. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166 n.16 (1987) ("mhe reach of the equal
protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment is coextensive with that of the Fourteenth
.... '). The fifth amendment's due process clause commands that "No person shall be...
deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law .. " U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
93. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). Compare City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 448 U.S. 469 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny to municipal racial classifications)
with Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (applying strict scrutiny to racial classi-
fications employed by the federal government).
94. See infra notes 101-47 and accompanying text.
95. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Board of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
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tempt to use race-neutral means, or if it appears questionable that the
programs will effect the desired change.96
A. Strict Scrutiny Analysis
The Supreme Court has interpreted the equal protection clause to require
a "heightened" standard of review for classifications based on race, ethnicity,
or gender.97 Prior to its decision in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, the
Court subjected governmental classifications based on race to "strict"
scrutiny.
98
Strict scrutiny requires that the classification serve a "compelling" govern-
mental interest, and that the means used to achieve that compelling interest
be "necessary" or "narrowly tailored." 99 In comparison, "intermediate"
scrutiny, the standard used to evaluate classifications based on gender, re-
quires only that the means be "substantially related" to the achievement of
an "important" governmental interest."00
1. Compelling Governmental Interest
While the Court requires a compelling governmental interest to justify
race-based classifications, the Court has never enunciated a test to determine
what typd of interest is compelling. In Regents of the University of California
v. Bakke,10'O the Court examined the admissions programs of the Univer-
sity's medical school.10 2 The medical school used two admissions proce-
dures, one for "regular" candidates, the other for "special" candidates,
including "economically and/or educationally disadvantaged" applicants
and minorities. 0 3 Special candidates did not have to meet the grade point
cutoff and were not ranked against candidates in the general admissions pro-
96. Id
97. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
98. Croson, 488 U.S. at 469; Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 496 (1980) (Powell, J.,
concurring); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290-91 (1978); Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
99. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976).
100. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724; Craig 429 U.S. at 197. The Supreme Court struggled with
the constitutionality of government sponsored minority preferences in four cases before its
decision in Metro. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 469; Wygant v. Jackson Board of Educ., 476 U.S.
267 (1986); Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 448; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265. The Court's cases produced
twenty-three opinions and made it difficult for lower federal courts to extract a majority hold-
ing and arrive at the governing principles and limitations. Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford,
Inc. v. FCC, 876 F.2d 902, 934 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Wald, J., dissenting).
101. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
102. Id at 272.
103. Id. at 273-74.
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cess. °' Bakke, a white male, applied to the medical school in 1973 and in
1974.105 Upon being denied admission for the second time, he challenged
the admissions process on the grounds that it violated both the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964."°6
Holding that racial and ethnic classifications of any kind are inherently
suspect and call for the most exacting judicial scrutiny, Justice Powell, in a
plurality opinion, invalidated the special admissions program and ordered
Bakke admitted to the medical school."07 Yet, the Court did not go so far as
to say that race could never be considered in admissions decisions. In fact,
the Court suggested that the goal of achieving a diverse student body was
sufficiently compelling to justify consideration of race in admissions deci-
sions under some circumstances.108 The Court rejected the special admis-
sions program involved in Bakke, however, because the program focused
solely on ethnic diversity and failed to consider a variety of factors which,
the Court implied, a university should weigh in attempting to create a heter-
ogeneous class.'" 9 The Court concluded that an admissions policy that con-
sidered only one factor hindered rather than furthered attainment of genuine
diversity. "0 Nevertheless, the Court's dicta in Bakke, "II implying that the
government has a compelling interest in achieving a diverse student body,
104. Id. at 275.
105. Id at 276.
106. Id at 277-78.
107. Id at 265, 320.
108. Id at 311-15. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun joined Justice Pow-
ell in holding that race could be a valid factor in the admissions process. Id at 320, 356-69
(Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Individual members of the Court have suggested or found that the promotion of "racial diver-
sity" may be a sufficiently compelling justification for the government to impose race-based
measures, at least in the context of promoting a diverse student body or a diverse faculty in
higher education. See id.: Wygant v. Jackson Board of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 306 (1986) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting); id at 315-17 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id at 286 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
109. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313-14. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stevens, Stewart, and
Rehnquist joined Justice Powell in this portion of the judgment. Id at 411-21.
110. Id at 315.
111. Id at 322-24. Justice Powell asserted that:
[A]cademic freedom ... is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the
teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amend-
ment .... The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure
to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues,
[rather] than through any authoritative selection.'
Id. at 312 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (quoting in part
United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 302, 372 (W.D.N.Y. 1943))).
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left room for later analogies concerning the government's interest in creating
broadcast programming diversity.
1 12
The only interest that the Supreme Court clearly has identified as compel-
ling is the interest in remedying the effects of past discrimination.113 In City
of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 114 Justice O'Connor, writing for the major-
ity, stated that racial classifications should be "strictly reserved for remedial
settings."" 5 In Croson, the Court examined a minority preference plan im-
plemented by the Richmond City Council.116 The plan required the city to
award minority-owned businesses a specified percentage of the dollar
amount of all city contracts. 117 The Court struck down Richmond's plan
because, in explaining its reasons for enacting the plan, the city made only a
"generalized assertion" of past discrimination."1 8 The Court held that with-
out a specific factual predicate on which to base the plan, the plan was not
remedial.1 19 Thus, the plan did not serve any compelling governmental in-
terest and did not withstand the Court's strict scrutiny test.120
In Fullilove v. Klutznick 2' the Court sustained the constitutionality of a
set-aside provision in the Public Works Employment Act (Employment Act)
by focusing on Congress' authority under the fourteenth amendment to en-
act measures to remedy past discrimination.1 22 The Employment Act re-
quired state and local grantees to use at least ten percent of federal funds
designated for local public works projects to procure services or supplies
112. See, e.g., West Michigan Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 735 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1027 (1985).
113. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (opinion of Powell, J.); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-97 (1989) (plurality opinion); id. at 536-38 (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 624-25 (1984); see also Wygant, 476 U.S. 267,
274 (1986) (plurality opinion) ("the Court has insisted upon some showing of prior discrimina-
tion by the governmental unit involved before allowing limited use of racial classifications in
order to remedy such discrimination").
114. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
115. Id. at 493.
116. Id. at 477-78.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 498.
119. Id. at 498-506.
120. Id. at 505.
121. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
122. The Court sharply divided in Fullilove, as it had in Bakke. The Chief Justice, joined
by Justices Powell and White, concluded that Congress, because of its pending power, had a
compelling interest in ensuring that grantees of the program would not engage in spending
patterns that would perpetuate the effects of past discrimination. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 473-80
(Burger, C.J., plurality opinion). Justice Powell, writing separately, also determined that, in
enacting the statute, Congress sought to further the compelling interest of eradicating the con-
tinuing effects of past discrimination. Id. at 497-506 (Powell, J., concurring).
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from minority-owned businesses. 123 Because the Employment Act provided
an administrative oversight process that could be invoked to waive the ten
percent requirement in specific cases, Chief Justice Burger determined that
Congress designed the program to ensure that the preference would be
awarded only to disadvantaged minority enterprises. 24
In upholding the constitutionality of the Employment Act, the plurality
opinion specifically recognized Congress' power under section 5 of the four-
teenth amendment "to enforce, by appropriate legislation," equal protection
guarantees. 125 Traditionally, that power has been invoked only to prohibit
the "perpetuation of prior purposeful discrimination." '26 In other words,
Congress has the constitutional power to redress the effects of discrimination
forbidden by the fourteenth amendment. In Fullilove, the Court found that
Congress had ample evidence to support its conclusion that minority-owned
businesses suffered discrimination in access to public contracting opportuni-
ties.127 Therefore, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the program,
reasoning that Congress could legislate "to ensure that those businesses were
not denied equal opportunity to participate in federal grants to state and
local governments."
' 128
Finally, in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 129 the Court enunci-
ated a three part test for evaluating governmental classifications based on
race, which incorporated elements of the Bakke and Fullilove standards. In
Wygant, several nonminority teachers who were laid off by the Jackson
Board of Education challenged the race-based layoff, arguing that it violated
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 3° The Court
123. Id. at 451.
124. Id at 482.
125. Id at 476.
126. Id at 476-77; see also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 348 U.S. 641, 651 ("Correctly viewed,
section 5 is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion
in determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Four-
teenth Amendment.").
127. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 476-77. Congress cited evidence that a nationwide history of
past discrimination had reduced minority participation in federal construction grants. Specifi-
cally, Congress asserted that "in fiscal year 1976 less than 1% of all federal procurement was
concluded with minority business enterprises, although minorities comprised 15-18% of the
population." Id. at 459. Congress drew on its experience under § 8(a) of the Small Business
Act of 1953, which had extended aid to minority businesses, emphasizing that it had ten years
of experience with discrimination in the contracting business. Id. at 460. Moreover, Congress
asserted that the intricacies of the bidding process, longstanding barriers impairing access by
minority enterprises to public contracting opportunities, and direct discrimination were caus-
ing the disparity. Id. at 460-63.
128. Id. at 478.
129. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
130. Id. at 273. Wygant involved a collective bargaining agreement between the Jackson,
Mississippi Board of Education and a teacher's union. Id. at 270. The agreement provided
[Vol. 40:403
Shouldn't The Constitution Be Color Blind?
agreed with the nonminority teachers. First, the Court held that racial clas-
sifications must be justified by a compelling state purpose, and that the
means chosen by the state to effectuate that purpose must be narrowly tai-
lored.13 1 Next, the Court announced that generalized societal discrimina-
tion alone is insufficient to justify a racial classification; there must be
convincing evidence of prior discrimination by the governmental unit in-
volved before the use of race-based measures to remedy such discrimination
is permissible. 132 As the final part of the test, if a program is effected to
remedy prior discrimination, the trial court must make a factual determina-
tion that there is sufficient evidence to justify the conclusion that remedial
action is necessary.' 33 Moreover, the Court rejected the lower court's rea-
soning that the racial preferences were permissible as an attempt to provide
role models for minority students. 3 4 The Court held that this goal could
not be classified as a compelling state interest justifying race-based
classifications. 35
2. Narrowly Tailored
The second part of strict scrutiny analysis requires that racial classifica-
tions be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.136  In
that, if layoffs became necessary, teachers with the least seniority would be laid off first. Id at
270-71. The agreement contained an important exception, however. The agreement provided
that the Board would lay off a percentage of minority personnel no greater than the percentage
of minorities employed by the school district at the time of the layoff. Id. at 270. In certain
years, the bargain resulted in layoffs of nonminority teachers, while minority teachers with less
seniority were retained. Id. at 272.
131. Id. at 274.
132. Id. at 274-76.
133. Id. at 277 ("Evidentiary support for the conclusion that remedial action is warranted
becomes crucial when the remedial program is challenged in court by nonminority
employees.").
134. Id. at 274-76.
135. Id The court of appeals held that the role model theory was "sufficiently important"
to justify the layoff provision. The court reasoned that because the percentage of minority
teachers in the Jackson school system was less than the percentage of minority students, there
was a need for more faculty role models. Id at 274.
In rejecting the lower court's theory, Justice Powell noted that:
because the role model theory does not necessarily bear a relationship to the harm
caused by prior discriminatory hiring practices, it actually could be used to escape
the obligation to remedy such practices by justifying the small percentage of black
teachers by reference to the small percentage of black students.
Id. at 276.
136. A number of Justices have described the required relationship between a classification
and the government's underlying purposes differently at different times. See, e.g., Palmore v.
Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) (classifications must be "necessary... to the accomplishment
of their legitimate purpose") (quoting McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964)); Fulli-
love v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 480 (1979) (opinion of Burger, C.J.) (classification must be
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Croson, the Court identified two factors that are particularly significant in
reviewing race-based classifications under the narrowly tailored prong. The
first seeks to determine whether the governmental authority attempted to
use alternative race-neutral remedies before resorting to race conscious
measures.' 37 Next, the Court questioned whether the racial preference is
limited to those who have in fact suffered the disadvantage of discrimina-
tion. 3 ' The Court has identified other factors relevant to the narrowly tai-
lored inquiry, such as the flexibility and planned duration of the remedy, and
the effect of the classification on innocent third parties.' 39 The Court con-
siders these factors to ensure that the means chosen to remedy the discrimi-
nation, the racial classification, fits the compelling goal so closely that there
is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification is illegitimate
racial prejudice or stereotype.
Under the narrowly tailored prong, the Court traditionally has rejected
the use of quotas and policies that rely on race alone. For example, in
Bakke, the Court held unconstitutional an admissions policy that used race
as the sole criterion in its admissions decisions."4 By contrast, in Fullilove,
even though the ten percent set aside constituted a quota, the Court upheld
the program, emphasizing that the waiver provision made the program suffi-
ciently flexible to ensure that race would only be taken into account where it
furthered the government's compelling purpose. 4' Looking at a third factor
under the narrowly tailored prong, the Fullilove Court noted that the burden
imposed on nonminorities was slight,' 42 and concluded that the program
was narrowly tailored to its remedial purposes.' 43
Croson further illustrates the Court's application of the narrowly tailored
prong. Like the program in Fullilove, in Croson, Richmond's plan contained
a waiver provision.'" The Croson waiver, however, was granted only when
narrowly tailored to the achievement of the purposes); id. at 537 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Ra-
cial classifications are simply too pernicious to permit any but the most exact connection be-
tween justification and classification.").
137. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507-09 (1989); see also Wygant,
476 U.S. at 283 (plurality opinion); Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 463-67 (opinion of Burger, C.J.); id
at 511 (Powell, J., concurring).
138. Croson, 488 U.S. at 507-08; d  at 517 (Stevens, J., concurring); Wygant 476 U.S. at
276 (plurality opinion); Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 480-82, 486-88 (opinion of Burger, C.J.); id at
510 (Powell, J., concurring).
139. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 282-83 (plurality opinion); id. at 287 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment); Fulliove, 448 U.S. at 514-15 (Powell, J., concurring).
140. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315 (1977).
141. Fullilove 448 U.S. at 487-88.
142. Id at 487-89.
143. Id at 492.
144. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 478 (1989). The waiver provision
provided that
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there were not enough minority contractors available to meet the thirty per-
cent requirement. 145 Because the waiver provision in Croson focused solely
on the availability of minority subcontractors, and not on whether the
favored minorities were the victims of past discrimination, the Court found
that the plan contained no nexus to its remedial purpose.'" Thus, because
the plan was not narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling governmental
interest of remedying past discrimination, the Court held it
unconstitutional.
1 47
B. West Michigan Broadcasting v. FCC: The Comparative Hearing
Preference Survives its First Test
Interpreting the Supreme Court's pronouncements on equal protection,
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit up-
held the constitutionality of the FCC's minority preference in comparative
hearings in West Michigan Broadcasting Co. v. FCC. 148 The D.C. Circuit
relied primarily on Bakke and Fullilove in holding the Commission's policy
constitutional. 49 The appellate court decided West Michigan in 1984,
before the Supreme Court's decisions in Wygant and Croson; therefore, sub-
sequent challenges to the FCC's policies questioned West Michigan in light
of the Supreme Court's later opinions.' 50
West Michigan arose when the Commission granted a construction permit
to Waters Broadcasting Company in a comparative hearing proceeding. 5'
Waters was fully owned by a minority who pledged to assume responsibility
for day to day management of the station.'52 The West Michigan Broad-
casting Company appealed, challenging the Commission's grant of merit to
Waters based on his minority status.'5 3
No partial or complete waiver of the foregoing [30% set-aside] requirement shall be
granted by the city other than in exceptional circumstances. To justify a waiver, it
must be shown that every feasible attempt has been made to comply, and it must be
demonstrated that sufficient, relevant, qualified Minority Business Enterprises... are




146. Id at 508-09.
147. Id at 509-11.
148. 735 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1027 (1985).
149. Id at 613-16.
150. See infra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
151. West Michigan, 735 F.2d at 602.
152. Id. at 603.
153. Id.
1991]
Catholic University Law Review
In West Michigan, the court applied two distinct tests to determine
whether the minority preference policy served a compelling government in-
terest. 154 First, the court assessed whether the comparative merit policy was
implemented to remedy past discrimination.' Relying on Congress' asser-
tion that the underrepresentation of minorities in broadcasting was the result
of past racial and ethnic discrimination, 156 the court found the FCC's policy
constitutional under this test.'5 7
Under the second test, the West Michigan court, extrapolating from
Bakke, concluded that broadcast diversity is a compelling interest in the
same way that creating a diverse student body is a compelling governmental
interest.15 8 The court likened the FCC's comparative hearing preference to
the type of admissions decision sanctioned by the Supreme Court in Bakke, a
policy recognizing race as only one of several factors in selecting from
among competing applicants. 15 Using this reasoning, the West Michigan
court upheld the constitutionality of the Commission's comparative merit
policy. 160
III. THE D.C. CIRCUIT'S INTERPRETATION OF EQUAL PROTECTION
DOCTRINE AS APPLIED TO THE FCC's MINORITY
PREFERENCE POLICIES
Subsequent challenges to the FCC's minority preference policies in the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit alleged
that the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Wygant v. Jackson
Board of Education and City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. undermined the
court of appeals' holding in West Michigan Broadcasting Co. v. FCC. The
challenges centered around two FCC minority preference policies: the dis-
tress sale and the comparative hearing preference. In Shurberg Broadcasting
of Hartford, Inc. v. FCC, a divided panel of the D.C. Circuit struck down the
Commission's minority distress sale policy. 161 In Winter Park Communica-
tions, Inc. v. FCC, however, a different three judge panel of the D.C. Circuit
154. Id. at 612-15.
155. Id. at 614.
156. Id at 616; see also H.R. REP. No. 765, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 43, reprinted in 1982 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2237, 2281 (past inequities stemming from racial and ethnic
discrimination lead to an underrepresentation of minorities in broadcasting).
157. 735 F.2d at 613-14.
158. Id. at 614-15.
159. Id. at 615.
160. Id.
161. Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc. v. FCC, 876 F.2d 902 (D.C. Cir. 1989), rev'd
sub norL Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
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upheld the Commission's comparative hearing preference.1 62 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to each of these cases, and, in Metro Broadcasting,
Inc. v. FCC, resolved the conflicting premises underlying the court of ap-
peals' decisions.
A. Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc. v. FCC: The D.C. Circuit
Assesses the Constitutionality of the FCC's Distress Sale Policy
In Shurberg, a license renewal proceeding for a television station in Hart-
ford, Connecticut resulted in a constitutional challenge to the Commission's
distress sale policy.'6 3 The licensee of the television station, Faith Center,
Inc., faced the possible loss of its license when Faith Center's renewal appli-
cation was designated for hearing.'" The Commission decided to investi-
gate allegations that Faith Center had solicited funds over the air that were
used for purposes other than those described in its broadcast. 165
Several months after receiving its hearing designation order, Faith Center
petitioned the FCC for permission to assign its license under the distress sale
policy.' 66 The Commission granted Faith Center's request, but the proposed
sale to a minority purchaser was never consummated.1 67 Two years after its
first request to invoke the distress sale policy, Faith Center made a second
request to the Commission for permission to pursue a distress sale.'
16
Again, the sale fell through.'
69
Meanwhile, Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc. tendered an applica-
tion to the FCC for permission to build a television station in Hartford. 7°
The Shurberg application was mutually exclusive with Faith Center's still-
pending renewal application, however, meaning that the stations could not
coexist.' Faith Center reacted by again seeking Commission approval for
a distress sale, this time to the Astroline Communications Company. 2
Commission approval precluded Shurberg from receiving a construction per-
mit to operate its proposed station. Therefore, Shurberg opposed the dis-
162. Winter Park Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 873 F.2d 347 (D.C. Cir. 1989), aff'd sub
norm. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
163. Shurber& 876 F.2d at 905.
164. Id. at 904.
165. Id. at 904.
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tress sale on numerous grounds, including the contention that the distress
sale policy violated Shurberg's constitutional right to equal protection.
173
Rejecting Shurberg's constitutional challenge as "without merit," the
FCC approved the distress sale of the station to Astroline. 174 In support of
its distress sale policy, the Commission relied on the diversity rationale.
175
The Commission also noted that Congress expressly required incorporation
of significant preferences for minority applicants into the FCC's licensing
scheme. 176
Shurberg sought judicial review of the Commission's order in the D.C.
Circuit. 177 The court delayed disposition of the appeal, however, by grant-
ing a Commission request to remand the record for further consideration in
light of a separate, non-adjudicatory inquiry at the FCC. 178 This inquiry
was designed to explore the validity of the Commission's minority preference
policies, including the distress sale.' 79 Prior to completion of the inquiry,
however, Congress prohibited the FCC from expending any monies to inves-
tigate the Commission's minority preference policies.'5 ° Consequently, the
FCC closed the inquiry and reaffirmed its original order permitting the li-
cense assignment to Astroline.' 8 '
173. Id. at 903.




178. Id at 906-07. That inquiry was a result of the D.C. Circuit's decision in Steele v.
FCC, 770 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The court in Steele held that the FCC lacks statutory
authority to grant enhancement credits in comparative license proceedings to female owners.
In a per curiam opinion, a majority of the Steele panel likened the comparative preferences to a
social engineering experiment. Id. at 1198.
Following the Steele decision, the FCC petitioned for rehearing en banc. In its brief, how-
ever, the Commission admitted that its existing racial and gender preferences violated equal
protection standards. Supplemental Brief for the FCC at 13-15, Steele v. FCC, 770 F.2d 1192
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (No. 84-1176). Moreover, the Commission noted that recent Supreme Court
decisions, namely Bakke and Fulliove, compelled a reevaluation of the minority preference
schemes. Id The Commission asserted that, under the Supreme Court's new guidelines, racial
classifications could not be based on the mere assumption that integrated minority owners
would result in increased minority-oriented programming. Id. Therefore, the Commission
requested that the court of appeals allow the agency to conduct a comprehensive study to
determine whether a nexus truly does exist between minority ownership and program diver-
sity. Id. The D.C. Circuit approved the request, and the FCC began an inquiry to gather the
empirical data necessary to support its racial and gender preference schemes. Notice of In-
quiry in MM Docket No. 86-484, 1 F.C.C. Red 1315 (1986), modified, 2 F.C.C. Rd 2377.
179. See Notice of Inquiry in MM Docket No. 86-484, 1 F.C.C. Rd at 1315.
180. Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc. v. FCC, 876 F.2d 902, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1989),
rev'd sub nom. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990); see also supra notes
16-17 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' appropriations riders).
181. Shurberg 876 F.2d at 907.
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On appeal, a divided court held the distress sale policy unconstitu-
tional."8 2 In a per curiam opinion, the panel majority stated that the policy
deprived Shurberg of its fifth amendment equal protection rights because the
program was neither narrowly tailored to remedy past discrimination nor to
promote programming diversity.'" 3 The court emphasized that the distress
sale policy unduly burdened nonminorities and was not reasonably related to
achieving the interests it sought to vindicate.
184
182. Id at 934.
183. Id The court first evaluated the distress sale policy as a means to remedy past dis-
crimination. Applying Croson, the District of Columbia Circuit stated that the Supreme
Court's decision permitted Congress to impose affirmative action programs on an industry
only when Congress could prove actual damage resulting from discrimination in that particu-
lar industry. Id at 915 (demanding a "quantum of particularized evidence of the effects of
societal discrimination in the relevant industry"). The Shurberg court cited statements by
Congress which note that the underrepresentation of minorities in broadcasting "is merely part
of the larger phenomenon of minority underrepresentation in certain professions and occupa-
tions." Id at 914. Moreover, the court noted that while minority entry into broadcasting may
be "hindered by difficulties in obtaining financing .... minorities' lack of money is not linked
to specific discriminatory practices." Id at 914 n.15. Judge Silberman, writing for the panel
majority, hypothesized that the underrepresentation of minorities in the media might be ex-
plained by the notion that minorities are disproportionately attracted to other industries. Id
at 915.
The court of appeals also examined whether the FCC's diversity rationale could be classified
as a compelling government injerest. Id. at 919. While acknowledging that the Supreme
Court categorized racial diversity as a compelling government interest in Bakke, Judge Silber-
man noted that only one Supreme Court Justice had actually proffered this opinion. Id The
Shurberg court also indicated that in Croson, a plurality of the Supreme Court stated that
based on classifications race should be used strictly as remedial measures. Id at 919 (quoting
Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)). Judge Silberman questioned whether there is a compelling
interest in increasing the diversity of programming, deeming it an "Orwellian notion" to sug-
gest that the government has a role in educating the general public through regulation of
program content in the media. Id at 920 n.27.
Chief Judge Wald, dissenting, accepted the conclusion that bringing different perspectives to
listening audiences was of sufficient import to justify regulations favoring minority applicants.
Id at 935 (Wald, J., dissenting). Moreover, Chief Judge Wald distinguished Croson, indicating
that the restrictions placed on state and local affirmative action programs could not be easily
transferred to programs supported by Congress. Id
184. Id. at 934. Judge Silberman noted that in carrying out the distress sale policy, the
FCC did not adjust the degree of preference to the buyer's actual past disadvantage or discrim-
ination. Id at 916. Judge Silberman also emphasized that the distress sale policy overly bur-
dened nonminority groups. The court recognized that Mr. Shurberg was deprived of "a
unique opportunity to own a broadcasting station, solely because of his race." Id. at 917.
The court denied a rehearing en banc. Id at 958. In the opinion denying a rehearing, Judge
MacKinnon relied on Croson to conclude that a racial preference can only be upheld if it is but
one of several factors considered in awarding a broadcast license. Id at 954. Judge MacKin-
non wrote that "any racial or group preference is inherently suspect," and "must be subject to
close and careful scrutiny and can only be upheld to justify an award to promote programming
diversity if it is one of several factors that entered into the decision." Id.
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B. Winter Park Communications, Inc. v. FCC: The D.C. Circuit
Looks at the FCC's Comparative Hearing Preference
Three weeks after the Shurberg decision, the D.C. Circuit issued its opin-
ion in Winter Park Communications, Inc. v. FCC. 5 In Winter Park three
applicants were competing for a new UHF television channel assigned to
Orlando, Florida."s6 The applications were designated for a comparative
hearing to evaluate the relative qualifications of each applicant. 8 7 The ad-
ministrative law judge (ALJ) disqualified one of the applicants, Rainbow
Broadcasting, for misrepresentations in its proposal, and awarded the license
to Metro Broadcasting, Inc.1
8 8
The FCC's Review Board'"9 reversed the ALJ's decision and awarded the
permit to Rainbow." 9 The Board determined that Rainbow was a qualified
applicant and then compared all three applicants.' 9 ' The Board concluded
that Rainbow was entitled to a substantial preference because it was ninety
percent owned by minorities who pledged to work at the station full time.' 92
Metro Broadcasting and Winter Park Communications appealed, alleging
that the comparative hearing preference policy violated the fifth amendment.
A divided court of appeals affirmed the Commission's decision upholding
the policy.' 93 The majority held that West Michigan resolved the question of
the policy's constitutionality." 4 The court noted that the enhancement
credit for minority participation easily passed constitutional muster because
the Commission considered race as but one factor in a competitive multi-
factor selection system.' 95 Moreover, the court emphasized that Congress
recognized that the underrepresentation of minorities in broadcasting
185. 873 F.2d 347 (D.C. Cir. 1989), aff'd sub nom. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110
S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
186. Id. at 349.
187. Id. at 350.
188. Id.
189. For a discussion of the FCC's procedures for review, see supra note 58.
190. 873 F.2d at 350.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 353.
194. Id. Because West Michigan was decided before Croson, the Winter Park court was
forced to determine the effect of the Supreme Court's decision in Croson. The court of appeals
concluded that Croson did not tamper with the constitutional framework underlying the West
Michigan decision. Id. Distinguishing the FCC's policy from the minority set-aside policy
involved in Croson, the court of appeals noted that the enhancement credits given to minorities
in the comparative hearing process were not inflexible racial quotas. Id. at 354.
195. Id. at 353.
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stemmed from racial discrimination; therefore, the court deemed the en-
hancement a valid remedial measure.'
96
Thus, the D.C. Circuit invalidated the minority distress sale policy and
upheld the comparative preference policy. The court apparently distin-
guished the two policies on the grounds that, in Winter Park, minority pref-
erence was but a plus factor in awarding a broadcast license, while in
Shurberg, minority preference was the absolute determinative factor. To re-
solve the underlying constitutional questions, the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari and consolidated the cases for decision in Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC.
IV. METRO BROADCASTING, INC V. FCC: SETrLING THE
CONTROVERSY OVER THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RACIAL
PREFERENCES EMPLOYED BY THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT
In Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC., 97 the United States Supreme Court,
in a decision written by Justice Brennan, upheld the constitutionality of both
the distress sale policy and the comparative hearing preference.' 9" The ma-
jority refused to apply strict scrutiny to the race-based classifications at is-
sue. Instead, the Court applied an intermediate test to race conscious
measures mandated by Congress.' 99 Rather than analyzing whether the
FCC's racial classifications were "narrowly tailored" to achieve a "compel-
ling" government interest, Justice Brennan concluded that the Court would
uphold "benign racial classifications" that serve "important" governmental
196. Id
197. 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
198. Id at 3002. Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined in the majority
opinion. Justice Stevens also filed a separate concurrence, voicing his approval of the adoption
of a forward looking level of scrutiny for racial classifications. Id at 3028 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring). The history of Justice Stevens' approach to affirmative action is an interesting one. In
1978, he voted against the preferential admissions policy at issue in Bakke. In 1980, he
strongly dissented from the decision in Fullilove upholding the constitutionality of congressio-
nally mandated set-asides on federally funded construction projects. Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U.S. 448, 553-54 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting). As of that date, Justice Stevens had
opposed racial preferences of any sort. More recently, however, Justice Stevens has emerged
as one of the strongest supporters of employment quotas. In redefining his position, Justice
Stevens has emphasized what he has termed forward looking justifications. For example, he
dissented from the 1986 decision in Wygant, arguing that the educational benefits of an inte-
grated faculty could justify racial preference to speed the integration. Wygant v. Jackson
Board of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 313-15 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Although he reiterated
that reasoning in Croson, he sided with the majority because of his belief that minority set-
asides are not socially useful. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 448 U.S. 469, 511-17
(1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
199. Metro, 110 S. Ct. at 3008.
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objectives and that are "substantially" related to the achievement of those
objectives.2 'a While Justice Brennan's opinion does not explain why the ma-
jority classified the minority preference policies as "benign," Supreme Court
precedent indicates that benign measures "essentially involve a choice made
by dominant racial groups to disadvantage themselves," and are employed
for the asserted purpose of aiding a minority.2"1
A. The Majority Rejects the Strict Scrutiny Test for Congressionally
Established Racial Classifications
The majority adopted a two part test for analyzing racial classifications
employed by Congress: (1) the measure must serve an important govern-
mental objective and (2) the measure must be substantially related to the
achievement of that objective.20 2 The Court's reasoning appears to contra-
dict its holding in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.20 3 In Croson, a ma-
jority of the Court agreed that strict scrutiny applies to all racial
classifications, even "remedial" or "benign" ones.2 ' 4 In adopting this lower
level of scrutiny, the Metro Court distinguished Croson, reasoning that
Croson did not prescribe the level of scrutiny to be applied to racial classifi-
cations employed by Congress.2 ' 5
Justice Brennan based this conclusion on the Court's holding in Fullilove
v. Klutznick.2' 6 Specifically, Justice Brennan pointed to Chief Justice Bur-
ger's language in Fullilove acknowledging that Congress has the power to
enforce the fourteenth amendment's equal protection guarantees. 207 Imply-
ing that the FCC adopted the minority preference programs at Congress'
direction, Justice Brennan concluded that the Court should defer to the
competence of the legislature and uphold the constitutionality of the
programs. 20
Justice Brennan also used Fullilove to support the majority's adoption of a
lower level of scrutiny, reasoning that three members of the Fullilove Court
200. Id
201. See, e.g., Croson, 448 U.S. at 495.
202. Metro, 110 S. Ct. at 3008-09.
203. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
204. Id at 493.
205. Metro, 110 S. Ct. at 3008-09.
206. Id. at 3008 (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980)).
207. Id ("(W]e are 'bound to approach our task with appropriate deference to the Con-
gress, a co-equal branch charged by the Constitution with the power to 'provide for the...
general Welfare of the United States' and 'to enforce, by appropriate legislation,' the equal
protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.'" (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 472
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.1))).
208. Id. at 3008-09.
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would have applied an intermediate level of scrutiny to the congressional
measure at issue, while three other members of the Fullilove Court focused
on whether the legislation's objectives were within Congress' power.2°9 Jus-
tice Brennan interpreted this precedent to mean that a congressionally ap-
proved preference need not be subject to strict scrutiny.210
Deferring completely to Congress, Justice Brennan announced that benign
race-based measures mandated by Congress are constitutional if they serve
an important governmental objective, and need not be aimed at remedying
past discrimination.2" Moreover, Justice Brennan suggested that Congress
need not make more than a generalized assertion of societal discrimination
to support its racial classifications.212
1. Programming Diversity as an "Important" Governmental Objective
Applying the first prong of the test to the FCC's minority preference poli-
cies, the Court found that programming diversity is an important govern-
mental objective and, therefore, a valid constitutional basis for the policies.
The majority reasoned that by virtue of the limited number of broadcast
licenses available, the government was justified in putting restraints on licen-
sees.213 The majority compared the government's interest in creating a di-
versity of views and information on the airwaves to the interest in creating a
diverse student body identified in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke, and found the objectives to be similar.214 Based on this analogy, the
Court concluded that the interest in enhancing broadcast diversity was, at
the very least, an important governmental objective.215
209. Id at 3008. Justice Brennan asserted that three members of the Fulilove Court
"would have upheld benign racial classifications that 'serve important governmental objectives
and are substantially related to achievement of those objectives.'" l (quoting Fulilove, 448
U.S. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment)). Justice Brennan also noted that three
members of the Fullilove Court "inquired 'whether the objectives of th[e] legislation are within
the power of Congress' and 'whether the limited use of racial and ethnic criteria ... is a
constitutionally permissible means for achieving the congressional objectives.'" Id (quoting
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 473 (opinion of Burger, C.J.)(emphasis omitted)).
210. Id at 3008-09.
211. Id
212. Id at 3009.
213. Id at 3010. ("[I]t is axiomatic that broadcasting may be regulated in light of the rights
of the viewing and listening audience ....").
214. Id at 3010-11 "Just as a 'diverse student body' contributing to '"a robust exchange
of ideas"' is a 'constitutionally permissible goal' on which a race-conscious university admis-
sions program may be predicated, the diversity of views and information on the airwaves
serves important First Amendment values." Id at 3010 (quoting Regents ofthe Univ. of Cal.,
438 U.S. 265, 311-13 (1978)).
215. Id at 3010-11.
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2 The Majority Finds the FCC's Policies "Substantially Related" to
Achieving Programming Diversity
Under the second prong of its intermediate test, the Court analyzed the
relationship between expanded minority ownership and greater broadcast di-
versity to determine whether the FCC's policies were substantially related to
the important governmental objective of achieving programming diver-
sity.2" 6 Deferring to the expertise of Congress and'the Commission, the ma-
jority found no fault with the assumption that increased minority ownership
of broadcast stations would result in increased minority programming.2 7
The Court found the policies substantially related to achieving program-
ming diversity in other relevant aspects as well.2"' Specifically, Justice Bren-
nan concluded that the policies placed no impermissible burdens on
nonminorities.2"9 The majority emphasized that third parties could be
called upon to bear some of the burden of eradicating racial discrimination,
provided that the burden was not undue.220 Because the applicants in Metro
had no settled expectation that the FCC would grant their applications with-
out considering public interest factors such as minority ownership, the ma-
jority found that the programs placed no undue burden on nonminorities.221
B. The Dissent Rejects the Application of an Intermediate Level of
Scrutiny
The dissent sharply criticized the majority's use of a lesser equal protec-
tion standard. Justice O'Connor, writing for the dissent, asserted that the
Court had no constitutional basis for applying an intermediate level of scru-
tiny to race-based measures employed by Congress.222 Therefore, Justice
O'Connor argued that the FCC's policies should be analyzed under strict
216. Id. at 3011.
217. Id. ("We are required to give 'great weight to the decisions of Congress and the
experience of the Commission.' ") (quoting Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973)).
218. Id. at 3019.
219. Id at 3025.
220. Id. at 3025-26.
221. Id at 3026-27. While distress sales have been categorized as a 100 percent set-aside
program, Justice Brennan reasoned that the policy is not unduly burdensome because
Nonminority firms are free to compete for the vast remainder of license opportunities
available in a market that contains over 11,000 broadcast properties. Nonminorities
can apply for a new station, buy an existing station, file a competing application
against a renewal application of an existing station, or seek financial participation in
enterprises that qualify for distress sale treatment.
Id at 3027.
222. Id at 3028-29 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The Chief Justice, Justice Scalia, and Jus-
tice Kennedy joined in the dissent.
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scrutiny to determine whether they are narrowly tailored to achieve a com-
pelling government interest.223
The dissent emphasized that no lower level of scrutiny should apply to the
federal government because "[t]he Constitution's guarantee of equal protec-
tion binds the Federal Government as it does the states. ' 2 2 4  Justice
O'Connor indicated that the Court has repeatedly held the reach of the equal
protection guarantee of the fifth amendment to be coextensive with that of
the fourteenth. 22 5 Moreover, the dissent rejected the majority's reliance on
Fullilove to support its application of intermediate scrutiny.2 2 6 The dissent
distinguished Fullilove as applicable only to Congressional measures
designed to remedy identified past discrimination. 22
The dissent concluded that, under the strict scrutiny standard, the FCC's
minority preference policies would not pass constitutional muster.2 2 8 Ac-
cording to Justice O'Connor, broadcast diversity is not a compelling govern-
mental interest, and therefore does not satisfy the first prong of the strict
scrutiny test.229 Justice O'Connor noted that modem equal protection doc-
trine has recognized only one such interest: remedying the effects of past
discrimination. 230 Because the FCC's policies were not designed as remedial
measures, the dissent concluded, they serve no compelling governmental
purpose.
231
Further, under the second prong of the strict scrutiny test, the dissent
concluded that the policies challenged were not narrowly tailored. Justice
223. I at 3029, 3032. Justice O'Connor expressed the concern that "'[a]bsent searching
judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-based measures, there is simply no way of
determining what classifications are 'benign' or 'remedial' and what classifications are in fact
motivated by racial inferiority or simple racial politics.'" Id. at 3032 (quoting City of Rich-
mond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 448, 493 (1989)).
224. Id. at 3030.
225. Id
226. Id. Justice O'Connor stated that the Court applied a different form of review in Fulli-
love only because Congress was exercising its powers under section 5 of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Id
227. Id at 3031. In Fullilove, Congress identified discriminatory practices within the con-
struction industry. In Metro, Justice O'Connor emphasized that the FCC had no such reme-
dial purpose for its race based classifications. Id
228. Idr at 3044.
229. Id at 3036.
The FCC's extension of the asserted interest in diversity of views ... presents...
an unsettled First Amendment issue.... Although we have approved limited meas-
ures designed to increase information and views generally, the Court has never up-
held a broadcasting measure designed to amplify a distinct set of views or the views
of a particular class of speakers.
I i
230. Id at 3034.
231. Id at 3034-35.
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O'Connor emphasized that the interest in increasing the diversity of broad-
cast viewpoints would justify discrimination against the members of any
group whose viewpoint was deemed sufficiently covered in the broadcast
spectrum. 2 3 2 Moreover, the dissent questioned how the FCC could identify
a black viewpoint, an Arab viewpoint, or any other viewpoint.233 The dis-
sent sharply criticized the majority's reasoning that an applicant's race
would likely indicate his particular perspective.2 4 Justice O'Connor noted
that the evidence provided no support for the proposition that a broadcast
owner's race is related to his station's programming. 23 The dissent also
pointed out that market forces, rather than the owner's race, largely shape
what goes on the air.236 Therefore, Justice O'Connor concluded that the
Commission should look to proposed programming rather than racial back-
ground when assessing which applicants promise to best serve the public
interest.237
Justice O'Connor also maintained that the FCC programs were unduly
burdensome because they denied nonminorities the right to an exceptionally
valuable property on the basis of race.2 31 The dissent characterized the dis-
tress sale as a one hundred percent set aside program, and asserted that race
was the dispositive factor in a substantial percentage of comparative pro-
ceedings.239 Therefore, the dissent concluded, the policies failed to satisfy
the narrowly tailored prong.
24°
In a separate dissent joined by Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy likened the
Metro decision to the Court's decision in Plessy v. Ferguson. Justice Ken-
nedy reasoned that the Court's characterization of the FCC's policies as "be-
nign racial conscious measures" was reminiscent of Plessy's "separate but
equal" doctrine.24' Justice Kennedy asserted that strict scrutiny is the only
test the Court can apply to satisfy the constitutional guarantee of equal pro-
tection.242 Justice Kennedy sharply criticized the majority for concluding
that "increas[ing] the listening pleasure of media audiences" justified dis-
criminating on the basis of race.
243
232. Id at 3036-38.
233. Id at 3035.
234. Id. at 3035-37.
235. Id. at 3037-38.
236. Id. at 3037-39.
237. Id. at 3039-40.
238. Id. at 3043.
239. Id
240. Id. at 3044.
241. Id. (Kennedy and Scalia, JJ., dissenting).
242. Id. at 3045.
243. Id. at 3044.
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V. THE SUPREME COURT'S REJECTION OF STRICT SCRUTINY
ANALYSIS: AN IMPROPER INTERPRETATION OF
FUNDAMENTAL EQUAL PROTECTION PRINCIPLES
A. A Critical Assessment of the Court's Opinions
The Court's decision in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC has set a danger-
ous precedent for justifying the use of race-based classifications. Whereas in
previous cases the Court subjected any program that discriminated on the
basis of race to strict scrutiny,2" in Metro, the Court declined to apply such
scrutiny, declaring that discrimination is constitutional, as long as it serves
some "important" governmental interest.245 In Metro, "increas[ing] the lis-
tening pleasure of media audiences" was held a sufficient governmental in-
terest to justify discrimination. 2" Moreover, the majority abandoned the
need for tying racial classifications to the effects of past discrimination.2 47
1. The Majority's Lack of a Constitutional Basis for Applying an
Intermediate Level of Scrutiny
Prior to deciding Metro, the Court, in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co.,2 48 extensively discussed the level of scrutiny to be applied to race con-
scious measures, following the precedents set forth in Regents of the Univer-
sity of California v. Bakke,249 Fullilove v. Klutznick,250 and Wygant v.
Jackson Board of Education.2"' In those opinions, the Court explained that
strict scrutiny is the only test to be applied to classifications based on race.
252
The Court's opinions recognized that race based classifications must be
strictly reviewed because at the same time a racial classification helps one
group of citizens, it denies constitutional protection to another. Therefore,
the Court held that race-conscious measures should be used only when they
are necessary to remedy the effects of specific past discrimination. 25 3 The
Court's logic was sound; when race-based classifications are used to correct
identified discrimination, the classifications implicitly balance the equal pro-
tection of one group against another. While race based measures may result
in one class receiving favored treatment, that favored treatment is designed
244. See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
245. Metro, 110 S. Ct. at 3009.
246. Id at 3044 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
247. Id. at 3008-09.
248. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
249. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
250. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
251. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
252. See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-95.
253. Id
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to equalize discriminatory treatment. Justice Brennan's relaxed scrutiny in
Metro means that for one group, the balance will be tilted.
Surprisingly, Justice Brennan's opinion discarded strict scrutiny for an in-
termediate test solely because the FCC's policies had congressional ap-
proval.254  Typically, when the Court is asked to pass on the
constitutionality of legislation, it does so delicately.255 Although Congress is
a co-equal branch of the federal government, its actions are not immune
from judicial scrutiny. In fact, the Court has never hesitated to invoke its
authority under the Constitution when it has determined that Congress has
overstepped the bounds of its constitutional power.2" 6 In Metro, Justice
Brennan deferred to the judgment of Congress on a constitutional question.
While the majority was willing to defer to Congress regarding a racial classi-
fication that adversely affects nonminorities, it is doubtful whether the same
deference would be readily forthcoming should Congress decide to employ a
program that the Court suspected would adversely affect minorities.
25 7
Justice Brennan's application of an intermediate level of scrutiny is closer
to a politically influenced deference to Congress than a proper interpretation
of precedent. An analysis of the relevant Supreme Court precedent bolsters
this conclusion. The Metro majority's reliance on Fullilove to support the
adoption of an intermediate level of scrutiny is misplaced. In Fullilove,
Chief Justice Burger used neither strict scrutiny nor intermediate scrutiny in
evaluating the program at issue. Instead, the Court looked at whether the
objectives of the legislation were within the power of Congress, and whether
the limited use of racial criteria was permissible within the constraints of the
due process clause. 258 The Court did note, however, that the program in
Fullilove would survive strict scrutiny,259 and reiterated that racial classifica-
tions call for strict scrutiny.2so Moreover, at the time the Court decided
254. Metro, 110 S. Ct. at 3008 ("It is of overriding significance in these cases that the
FCC's minority ownership programs have been specifically approved-indeed, mandated--by
Congress.").
255. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 472; Blodgett v. Holden, 475 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (opinion
of Holmes, J.).
256. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94,
103 (1973) (holding that broadcasters were not obligated to accept paid advertisements from
"responsible" individuals and groups because regulation of program content is intolerable
under the first amendment).
257. Also surprising is the majority's deference to a Congressional "mandate" that has not
been codified. Congress' only expression of approval came in the form of a rider attached to
the FCC appropriations for 1988 and 1989. See supra notes 16-17. The FCC's minority pref-
erence policies are just that, FCC policies, and not legislation.
258. Fulllove, 448 U.S. at 473.
259. Id at 472-73.
260. Id
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Fullilove, a majority of the Justices had not yet decided which level of scru-
tiny to apply to "reverse" or "majority" discrimination cases. 26 1 That ques-
tion was clearly resolved in Croson, when a majority of the Court finally
agreed that strict scrutiny applies to all racial classifications, even "reme-
dial" or "benign" ones.2 62
Thus, the Metro Court's decision was a radical departure from modem
equal protection doctrine. First, Justice Brennan reasoned that Fullilove re-
quired the Court to defer to Congress.2 63 Justice Brennan's opinion, how-
ever, ignores the fact that the Fullilove decision turned on Congress' finding
that the set aside program employed was necessary to remedy the effects of
past discrimination. 26s The FCC has never asserted that it sought to remedy
past discrimination through its minority preference policies.265 In fact, Con-
gress has not specifically mandated that the Commission maintain a policy
of granting preferences to minority applicants in comparative license pro-
ceedings in order to remedy prior discrimination. The only relevant Con-
gressional action is the enactment of appropriations riders directing that the
status quo be maintained with respect to the Commission's policies.
2 6 6
Thus, it cannot be said that Congress has, through appropriate statutory
language, made an authoritative determination finding a compelling need to
rectify the effects of discrimination in the broadcasting industry.26 7
In addition to Fullilove, Justice Brennan cited Croson as support for
adopting an intermediate level of scrutiny for affirmative action programs
sanctioned by Congress.2 68 In Croson, the Court focused on racial classifica-
tions implemented not by Congress, but by a municipality. Moreover, while
Croson implied that section 5 of the fourteenth amendment permits Congress
more latitude than the states to use racial classifications, 2 69 the Croson Court
referred only to programs designed to remedy the effects of past discrimina-
tion. Because section 5 gives Congress the power to enforce the antidis-
criminatory provisions of the fourteenth amendment, it logically follows that
Congress also has the power to redress the effects of discrimination that the
261. See supra notes 121-28 and accompanying text.
262. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
263. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3008-09 (1990).
264. See supra notes 121-28 and accompanying text.
265. The FCC has asserted only the diversity principle as justification for its policies insti-
tuting minority preferences. See supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
266. See supra note 16.
267. In fact, Congress can point to no identified discrimination in the broadcasting arena.
See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
268. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3009-10 (1990).
269. Croso, 488 U.S. at 489-91.
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amendment forbids.27 ° While Congress is explicitly authorized under sec-
tion 5 to enforce the fourteenth amendment's antidiscrimination norms, no-
where does the Constitution explicitly empower Congress to promote
broadcasting diversity. Thus, Congressional approval adds little to the con-
stitutional analysis of a racial classification designed to increase the variety
of programs available to radio and television audiences.27 '
2. Broadcast Diversity is Not an "Important" Governmental Objective
The majority's argument that promoting broadcasting diversity justifies
the use of racial classifications also holds little weight. As Justice Scalia
pointed out in his concurrence in Croson, "discrimination on the basis of
race is illegal, immoral, unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and destructive
of a democratic society." '272 The Metro dissent correctly asserts that enhanc-
ing the listening pleasure of our nation's audiences is hardly just cause for
sanctioning discrimination. 3  Even the argument that these policies are
necessary to create programming diversity rings hollow for several reasons.
First, neither Congress nor the Commission has offered empirical proof of a
nexus between minority ownership and minority programming.274 Inherent
270. See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
271. Moreover, neither the structural guarantees of the Constitution nor the express grant
of "unique remedial powers" under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment can eliminate the
need for careful judicial scrutiny of any program adopted by the federal government that clas-
sifies individuals according to their race.
272. Croson, 488 U.S. at 521 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting A. BICKEL,
THE MORALrrY OF CONSENT 133 (1975)).
273. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3044 (1990).
274. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. The majority cites a study by the Congres-
sional Research Service as empirical evidence of the nexus. Metro, 110 S. Ct. at 3017 n.31.
This study was based on data from approximately 9000 responses to an FCC survey of about
11,000 American radio and television stations. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, MI-
NORITY BROADCAST STATION OWNERSHIP AND BROADCAST PROGRAMMING: IS THERE A
NEXUS? (June 29, 1988) [hereinafter CRS Report]. The survey first asked station owners what
percentage of the ownership interest in their station was held by women or members of specific
minority groups. It then posed questions concerning programming conduct; specifically, it
asked whether programming was directed to or provided special services for any of nine listed
groups, including specific minorities, women, children, and senior citizens. Respondents were
asked to state whether the targeting or format was for 1-19 hours per week or for more than 20
hours per week.
The CRS found some correlation between minority ownership and "audience-targeted pro-
gramming." Whereas only 20 percent of stations without any black ownership responded that
they engage in "black programming," 65 percent of stations with black ownership said that
they did so. Id at 13. For Hispanic ownership and Hispanic programming, the corresponding
figures were 10 percent and 59 percent.
Judge Stephen Williams provided an insightful analysis of the CRS survey in his Winter
Park opinion. Judge Williams noted that there was a methodological flaw in the survey. Win-
ter Park Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 873 F.2d 347, 359 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Williams, J.,
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in the Court's assumption that there exists a causal link between ownership
and programming is a stereotype that does minorities a great disservice. As
Justice Powell aptly noted in Bakke, racial classifications carry a danger of
stigmatic harm.27 The FCC's minority preference policies reinforce the
stereotype that a person's race dictates the type of music he listens to or the
programs he watches on television. In any event, the majority's opinion is
flawed because it fails to recognize the simple fact that it is the market that
dictates media programming, not the station's owner.276
Second, even if it can be shown that minority ownership leads to minority
programming, it is questionable whether the United States is so lacking in
diverse programming as to render using racial classifications to achieve this
goal constitutional.277 The FCC itself has recognized that there is an ade-
quate diversity of programming in the United States, if not an overabun-
dance.27 Because there is likely no real need in the market to enhance
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Specifically, the designers made no effort to adjust
for possible differences in the racial composition of the various station owners' potential audi-
ences. Id Judge Williams asserted that this flaw made it "impossible to examine the role of
market demand as a force behind programming decisions." Id For instance, "Hispanic-
targeting" is likely to be more profitable in Miami than in Minneapolis. Thus, Judge Williams
concluded, "if specific minorities are more likely to own stations in areas where minorities are
more numerous (as seems likely), the difference in targeting, which the Report hesitantly at-
tributes to the owners' racial characteristics, may be due simply to their rational responses to
demand." Id Judge Williams went on to cite the CRS Report itself, which acknowledged that
it "would be difficult to determine to what degree station programming strategies are market
driven rather than the results of minority ownership interests." Id (quoting CRS Report at 3).
Judge Williams also asserted that the survey's failure to define "minority targeted program-
ming was far more critical than this methodological flaw, stating, "[A]s the survey omitted
that vital step, it and the Report prove only that black owners are more likely to say that they
target black audiences, Hispanic owners that they target Hispanic audiences, and so on." Id
Had Congress identified minority-targeted programming, the entire exercise would "almost
necessarily have constituted the crudest type of racial stereotyping." Id.
275. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 269 (1978).
276. Any argument that a television station's owner dictates programming is further di-
luted by the fact that most television stations affiliate with one of the major commercial net-
works and delegate many programming decisions to the networks. See 1 NETWORK INQUIRY,
SPECIAL STAFF, FCC, NEW TELEVISION NETWORKS: ENTRY, JURISDICTION, OWNERSHIP
AND REGULATION 298 (1980).
277. There are presently 12,118 radio stations and 4,150 television stations licensed in the
United States. BROADCASTING, October 1, 1990, at 75. Moreover, within the TV household
universe of 92.1 million, 58.6% subscribe to cable. Id Therefore, cable television has nearly
54 million subscribers, each of whom more than likely receives upwards of thirty channels.
Given the variety of programming that is provided by this abundance of media outlets, diver-
sity hardly seems a problem, nonetheless a compelling interest.
278. See Syracuse Peace Council v. Television Station WTVH, 2 F.C.C. Rcd 5043 (1988).
In Syracuse, the FCC eliminated the fairness doctrine, under which licensees were required to
affirmatively seek to cover controversial issues in their communities and then provide a reason-
able opportunity for the discussion of contrasting viewpoints. The Commission held that the
policy was no longer necessary because of an adequate diversity of viewpoints in the media.
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diverse programming, it is unnecessary for the Court to adopt increasing
diversity as an important state interest.
B. The Dangerous Ramifications of an Intermediate Level of Scrutiny
Metro leaves doubt as to whether courts will be able to "smoke out" ille-
gitimate uses of race. By eliminating the requirement that race-based classi-
fications serve only to remedy past discrimination, Justice Brennan grants
the judiciary ample room to cloud the distinction between "benign" classifi-
cations and those motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority.
While the Court's reasoning apparently reflects the belief that Congress, as
the government branch closest to the electorate, will act only when it has
adequate support to do so, analysis of Congress' support for the FCC's mi-
nority preference policies shows that Congress is fallible. Congress can
neither point to an identified discrimination within the broadcasting industry
as support for the policy, nor can it provide empirical support for the nexus
it offers as justification for the policies.279 In addition, Metro leaves room for
any racial group with political strength to influence the development of pro-
grams that unnecessarily favor them, while placing a burden on
nonminorities.2 80
The Metro decision sets a dangerous precedent by removing the check that
strict scrutiny placed on Congressional action. Moreover, while the Metro
Court presumably thought its decision would help to elevate the position of
minorities in this country, the decision will, in fact, have the opposite effect.
The FCC's minority preferences serve only to reinforce common stereotypes
holding that certain groups are unable to achieve success without special
protection based on a factor having no relation to individual worth. The
Id.; see also Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc. v. FCC, 876 F.2d 902, 921 (D.C. Cir.
1989), rev'd sub nom. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990). The D.C.
Circuit offered the following rationale in Shurberg:
If other media are substitutes for broadcasting for purposes of presenting diverse
viewpoints on controversial issues of public importance, thereby rendering the fair-
ness doctrine violative of the First Amendment in the view of the FCC, it seems
implausible that the FCC at the same time can have a compelling interest in continu-
ing to promote diverse programming through the distress sale policy.
Shurberg, 876 F.2d at 921.
279. See supra note 183.
280. Justice Stevens recognized this danger in Fulliove, stating:
[i]f there is no duty to attempt either to measure the recovery by the wrong or to
distribute that recovery within the injured class in an evenhanded way, our history
will adequately support a legislative preference for almost any ethnic, religious, or
racial group with the political strength to negotiate a 'piece of the action' for its
members.
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 539 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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preferences also reinforce the stereotype that a person's race will determine
his likes and dislikes.
VI. CONCLUSION
The FCC enacted its minority preference policies in order to increase the
diversity of programs that our nation's audience receives via radio and tele-
vision. Those policies, however, discriminate against nonminorities by de-
priving them of the substantial benefit of acquiring a radio or television
license based on their race, not on how well they will serve the public inter-
est. The Commission's policies generated substantial controversy over
whether the government's interest in creating programming diversity would
outweigh the pernicious effects of racial classifications.
In Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, the United States Supreme Court held
that racial classifications sanctioned by Congress do not violate equal protec-
tion principles. In arriving at its conclusion, the Court applied an intermedi-
ate level of scrutiny to the FCC's minority preference policies. The Court's
decision, therefore, leaves the federal government considerable latitude to
employ race-conscious measures that Congress considers "benign."
Yet, "benign race conscious measures" is a contradiction in terms. Any
classifications based on race are suspect, and should be subjected to strict
scrutiny. The majority's interpretation of the level of scrutiny that should be
applied to race-based measures employed by Congress sets a dangerous pre-
cedent that could result in such measures being used for illegitimate reasons.
The majority distorted the balance between the use of race based measures
and the government interest those measures are designed to achieve. In
Metro, the Court thwarted the values behind equal protection principles by
reducing the nature of the government's purpose in using racial classifica-
tions to one that is "important." The Court further insulted years of prece-
dent by holding up as a measuring stick for an "important" governmental
interest something as trivial and insupportable as the need to increase the
diversity of programs on radio and television. The result is, indeed, a return
to Plessy v. Ferguson.
Kathleen Ann Kirby
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